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Abstract—  Fresh  food  and  agricultural  products  from  sub-
Saharan Africa meet few tariff barriers because of preferential 
market access granted to ACP countries through Lomé and 
Cotonou  Act.  However,  non-tariff  barriers  are  still  serious 
impediments to trade. This paper focuses more specifically on 
technical  barriers  to  trade  (TBT)  and  sanitary  and 
phytosanitary  measures  (SPS)  on  horticultural  exports  from 
Kenya and Zambia to France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
United-Kingdom.  Using  an  extension  of  price-wedge  method 
that  takes  into  account  imperfect  substitution  (on  demand 
side) and differences in factor endowments (on supply side), we 
provide  a  tariff-equivalent  of  a  wide  range  of  TBT.  
Preliminary results show that the tariff-equivalent of TBT is 
very high for Kenyan green beans exports (more than 56%) 
while it is low for Kenya’s exports of peas and avocados and 
Zambian exports of peas (less than 10%).  However, there are 
no large differences between EU importing countries. 
 
Keywords— Armington elasticity of substitution, price-wedge 
method, tariff-equivalent 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fresh food and agricultural from African countries 
meet  less  customs  duties  because  of  preferential 
market  access  granted  to  them  in  the  framework  of 
ACP-EU  partnership.  On  the  other  side,  concerns 
around  non-tariff  barriers
1  are  becoming  more 
important.  International  agricultural  markets  are 
currently more complex and fast moving as standards 
are  promulgated  in  multiple  spheres  at  national  and 
international,  public  and  private  levels.  The  main 
concern  associated  with  non-tariff  barriers  and 
especially  technical barriers  to trade  (TBTs) is  their 
double facet. Their prima facie objective is to correct 
for  market  failures  stemming  from  externalities 
associated  with  the  supply  chain  [1].  On  the  other 
hand, TBT can also act as trade impediments and be 
                                                
1 The literature on NTBs defines them as the world of 
government measures, other than tariffs or customs taxes, which 
restrict or distort international commerce between domestic and 
imported goods and services 
used  for  protectionist  purposes  when  they  are  more 
stringent than necessary. 
This paper focuses more specifically on TBT 
and  SPS  measures  on  the  horticultural  exports  of 
Kenya  and  Zambia  to  the  European  markets
2.  We 
choose  horticultural  products  in  the  trade  relations 
between Kenya and Zambia and the four EU members 
for two reasons. First, fresh food products constitute 
important  opportunities  to  exports  diversification 
because they are luxury, i.e. high income elasticities 
and meet few tariff barriers. Second, fresh agricultural 
and food products face stringent food safety standards 
and regulations in developed countries markets.  
Regulations are not always based on science, 
non-discriminatory  or  least-trade-restrictive 
alternatives  as  they  must  under  the  SPS  and  TBT 
agreements. A lack of adequate scientific evidence and 
differing  interpretations  have  led  to  disputes  about 
regulations applied by particular countries. Moreover, 
private standards are not dealt with WTO bodies. This 
is the reason why there is an evident need to measure 
the effects of those technical regulations and standards 
to clarify any claim, quantify and contribute to resolve 
trade  disputes  and  define  more  efficient  regulations 
[2].  
The  remaining  of  the  paper  is  organized  as 
follows. The second section surveys the main studies 
that have used price-wedge method to quantify TBT 
and  SPS  measures.  The  third  section  presents  the 
analytical framework. The fourth section provides and 
interprets the empirical results while the last section 
concludes. 
 
                                                
2 Technical barriers to trade are the most important of the food 
safety standards in international agricultural trade: the notifications 
of new technical measures to WTO have grown from 300 in 1980 
to 3000 in 2000 [8].   2 
II. PRICE WEDGE METHOD AND TARIFF 
EQUIVALENT OF TECHNICAL 
REGULATIONS 
 
The price wedge method estimates the degree 
to  which  NTBs  raise  domestic  prices  above 
international  prices  in  the  countries  imposing  them. 
The  main  use  of  this  method  is  to  provide  a  tariff 
equivalent [3],[2] which is the tariff rate that would 
restrict trade to the same level as the technical barrier 
[3]. The tariff equivalent of a regulation is measured 
as  a  residue  when  the  price  difference  between  the 
imported  good  and  the  comparable  product  in  the 
domestic market is corrected for tariff, handling and 
transportation costs [2]. 
The  well-known  application  of  the  price 
wedge  method  to  compute  a  tariff  equivalent  is  the 
study  on  phytosanitary  barriers  in  the  US-Japanese 
apple  trade  [3].  The  gap  of  price  is  the  difference 
between the domestic Japanese price 
jj p and the price 
of  similar  U.S.  apples  delivered  to  Japan  which  is 
taken as a proxy for the world price
W p .
3 Then, the 
tariff  equivalent  of  the  Japanese  phytosanitary 
protocol is expressed as: 
  Tariff IT p p TE R
W jj
TBT − − − =     (1) 
where  R IT represents the transaction and international 
transport costs while Tariff designs custom duties.  
The main drawbacks of their approach are on 
one  hand  the  strong  assumption  that  no  other 
significant factors contribute to the price wedge [3]. 
According to the literature not yet published, there are 
other factors among which marginal costs that increase 
the price gap between domestic and c.i.f prices. On the 
other hand, authors assume that imports and domestic 
product  are  homogenous  goods.  In  the  case  of 
imperfect substitution, their method is useless. 
An interesting study has done to drop the law 
of  one  price  under  a  homogenous  commodity 
assumption  to  calculate  the  tariff  equivalent  of 
technical barriers in Japan on apple imports [4]. The 
authors  use  a  constant  elasticity  substitution  (CES) 
utility  function  assuming  that  local  and  imported 
                                                
3 [3] assume that the US apple price can serve as reasonable proxy 
for  the  world  price  since  United  States  is  the  leading  Western 
hemisphere  producer  and  exporter.  Furthermore,  the  authors 
assume that prices of apple from the State of Washington represent 
world prices as most U.S. apple exports originate from that state 
and  nearly  year-round.  We  adopt  index  i for  exporting  country 
and  j for country of destination. 
apples are imperfect substitutes and provide the tariff 
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where  σ is    the  elasticity  of  substitution  between 
imports and domestic varieties; α is the parameter of 
preferences  respectively;  ij q and  jj q are  marshallian 
demand  for  imports  and  domestic  products 
respectively; 
W p is again a proxy of world apple price, 
but it is exactly the price/unit cost of U.S. apple that is 
exported to other markets than Japan.  However, even 
if  they  deal  with  endogeneity  bias,  authors  do  not 
include  supply  aspects in  the determination of tariff 
equivalent but rather on the welfare analysis. 
 
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The  model  takes  into  account  both  demand 
and supply aspects. In the specific case of horticultural 
exports  from  Kenya  and  Zambia  (country  i)  to  the 
European  markets  (country  j ),  we  assume  that  a 
European  representative  consumer  allocates  his 
expenditures between a local product and his foreign 
imperfect substitute to maximize his utility function as 
follows [4]: 
Max ( )
j jj jj ij ij
ij jj jj jj j
Y q p q p t s


















α α   (3)  
The  ratio  of  marshallian  demand  obtained 
from (3) as in [4]provides an expression similar to that 
used  by  [5]  to  compute  short-run  and  long-run 
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The double-log transformation on relation (4) yields 
the following equation where the subscript t indicates 
time series: 
t O t X Y 1 β β + =         (5) 
We  follow  [4]  to  determine  three  main 
equations according to the results of the unit root tests 
on relation (5). First, when series  t Y and  t X  are log-  3 
level  stationary,  a  parsimonious  geometric  model 
(PGM) is specified; second, when both  t Y and  t X  are 
cointegrated, a single-equation error correction model 
(ECM) according to Engle and Granger (1987) in [6] 
is  estimated  and  provides  short  and  long-run 
elasticities;  third,  when  t Y and  t X   are  not 
cointegrated,  a  first-differenced  model  (FDM)  is 
estimated.  As  jj ij q q , and  jj ij p p , are  respectively 
quantities  and  prices  of  equilibrium,  we  suspect  a 
simultaneous bias in the regression relations (5). This 
is the reason why we rely on the supply side to get 
pertinent instrumental variables (IV) of relative prices.  
Imports  ij q   from  Kenya  and  Zambia  are 
considered  as  imperfect  substitutes  varieties 
domestically  supplied  jj q   in  France,  Germany,  The 
Netherlands or United Kingdom. By referring to [9], 
we can specify a profit function: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (.) (.) (.) . . . , , , , r w f q p F = π   (7)  which  generates 
through its maximization the marginal cost as follows: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ii r r w w f f
p
p
i r w f p
Cm r w f p Rm
q
j i j i j i
jj

























where  ( ) (.) (.) (.) , , r w f  is a vector of inputs prices: the 
land lease for agricultural land, the wage for labour 
and real interest rate for the capital factor respectively; 
(.) Rm is the marginal revenue and  (.) ε  the own-price 
elasticity of demand.  
To correct for the simultaneous bias, we run a 
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   (7ii) 



















1 ln ln 1 0 λ γ γ   (7iii) 
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IV. DATA SOURCES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
A. Data sources  
 
Three  horticultural  products  at  6  digits  of 
harmonised system (HS1996): peas (070810), greens 
beans (070820) and avocados (080440) are considered 
in this study. Annual time series from 1988 to 2006 of 
their  imports  in  tons  and  in  value  are  provided  by 
COMEXT database of Eurostat. Data on Kenyan and 
Zambian exports are provided by national databases. 
The unit value of exports is taken as the proxy of f.o.b. 
prices.  
Demand for domestically produced goods in EU 
countries  is  the  difference  between  domestic 
production  and  exports  and  the  related  data  are 
respectively  available  from  NEWCRONOS  and 
COMEXT databases of Eurostat. Tariffs are obtained 
from the integrated tariff for European Communities 
(TARIC).  The  real  interest  rate  and  the  agricultural 
wage,  proxied  by  the  real  income  per  capita,  are 
provided by the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database of the World Bank. Data on land lease are not 
available. 
Moreover, we make investigations in Kenya and 
in Zambia to know the kind of technical regulations 
and food and safety standards that impede horticultural 
exports.  They  are  of  three  main  groups:  regulation 
(EC)  n°1148/2001  of  12  June  2001,  Eurep-GAP 
protocol  and  British  Retail  Consortium  (BRC) 
technical food standard. Contrarily to the critics of [2] 
on the practical validity of the price wedge method, it 
in our case well indicated to assess the trade effect of 
all this array of NTBs. 
 
B. Empirical results and discussion 
 
Table1 reports results on short-run and long-
run  Armington  elasticities  of  substitution  obtained 
from our three main equations: PGM, ECM and FDM. 
Error correction models are predominant in the results. 
Adjusted  R-square  is  high  enough  to  conclude  in 
favour  of  well-specified  models.  We  observe  large 
                                                
4 The world price 
W p in our empirical estimates is proxied by the f.o.b 
price of Kenya for each of the three horticultural exports.   4 
elasticities for avocados and peas and small elasticities  for green beans. 
 
Table 1 Short-run and long-run Armington elasticities of substitution between Kenyan, Zambian and European varieties of 




***: significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively; coef: estimated coefficient; SE: standard-error; DW: Durbin-Watson 
test; n: number of observations; student statistic ratios are indicated in parentheses beneath the estimated coefficient 
Short-run elasticity  Long-run elasticty   


































France   Kenya  PGM        .126 
(.653) 
.194  .525  .774  2.30  17 
Germany   Kenya  ECM  0.047 
(.694) 
.068  .502  0.293
*** 
(3.07) 
.095  .008  .509  2.45  16 
Netherlands   Kenya  ECM  0.218
 
(1.36) 
.159  .194  .215 
(1.12) 







United Kingdom   Kenya  FDM  -.163
* 
(-1.95) 
.083  .071        .158  1.64  16 
Netherlands   Kenya  ECM  0.455 
(1.42) 
0.320  0.177  -3.76
*** 
(-4.62) 
0.815  .000  .479  1.80  17 
United Kingdom  Kenya  ECM  .209 
(.823) 




.314  .000  .425  2.07  17 
Netherlands   Zambia  ECM  .282 
(.982) 
.286  .344  -3.768
*** 
(-4.623) 





United Kingdom  Zambia  ECM  -.296 
(-1.69) 
.174  .114  -1.361
*** 
(-4.33) 
.314  .000  .519  1.49  18 
Avocados 
(080440) 
France  Kenya  ECM  .984
* 
(2.117) 
.464  .060  1.571
** 
(2.50) 
.627  .023  .704  1.35  16 
 
Our results are similar to the findings of [5].  
Long-run elasticities are four to six large than short-
run elasticities and there is strong variability of both 
short-run and long-run  elasticities  between products. 
Non  significant  and  negative  elasticities  could  be 
inherent to misspecification. Even if real interest rate 
and the proxy of wage explain well the unitary prices 
according to equation (6i), the results on instrumental 
variables (IV) estimates are not better than those on 
ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  as  shown  in  table  2.
5  
When  wage  proxy  and  interest  rate  are  included  in 
PGM,  ECM  and  FDM  as  additional  variables, 
Armington  elasticities  of  short-run  and  long-run  are 
not  significant  except  for  substitution  between 
Britannic and Kenyan varieties of green beans.  With 
these instrumental variables, we are not able to detect 
endogeneity  bias.  Remember  that  Hausman  statistic 
tests  equality  of  the  instrumental  variables  (IV)  and 
OLS estimates [7]. 
Table  3  provides  the  tariff-equivalent  of 
technical  barriers  to  trade  applied  to  the  exports  of 
Kenya  and  Zambia  to  the  EU  markets.  The  highest 
tariff  equivalent  is  observed  for  green  beans  trade 
between  Kenya  and  Germany  (56.11%)  and 
Netherlands  (37.38%).  Specific  tariff  equivalent  is 
                                                
5 The results on estimates of marginal costs by product and pair of trading 
partners are not reported in this document but are available on request. 
They show that interest rate elasticity is roughly lower than wage elasticity 
in both EU countries and the two African countries.  
middle (from 6.10 to 10.87% in average) in peas and 
avocados  trade  and  low  in the remaining cases.  For 
pea’s trade in general, tariff equivalent is increasingly 
important in time, becoming then three times greater 
since  1997  than  before.  Negative  tariff-equivalents 
mean that technical regulations are catalyst to promote 
exports. This could confirm our results of qualitative 
inquiries  that  we  made  in  COMESA  area  in  2006. 
Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS)’s 
staff states Kenyan exporters comply with regulations 
in  the  EU  markets.  However,  the  export  sector  has 




Our  instrumental  variables  do  not  permit  to 
provide  better  estimates  of  short-run  and  long-run 
Armington  elasticities.  Other  data  like  land  lease, 
investments in quality and agricultural internal support 
in  the  EU  and  large  sample  are  needed  to  get  best 
estimates.  However,  the  frequent  negative  value  of 
tariff  equivalent  suggests  that  the  marginal  costs 
should be included in the price gap.   5 
Table 2 OLS and IV estimates of short-run and long-run Armington elasticities 
Legend: PGM: Parsimonious geometric model, ECM: Error correction model, FDM: First differenced model 
Short-run elasticities  Long-run elasticities 
IV  IV 




Coef.  p-value 
OLS 
Coef.  p-value 
France   Kenya  PGM  -  -  -  .126  -.500 
(-1.632) 
.147 
Germany   Kenya  ECM  .047  -.0454 
(-.498) 
.668  0.293  -.039 
(-.693) 
.514 
Netherlands   Kenya  ECM  .218  .097 
(.285) 








Kenya  FDM  -1.63  -.168
* 
(-1.98) 
.078  -  -  - 
Netherlands   Kenya  ECM  0.455  0.368 
(1.276) 
.249  -3.76  .0214 
(.045) 
.965 
United Kingdom  Kenya  ECM  -.209  .075 
(.124) 
.907  -1.361  -.443 
(-1.28) 
.230 
Netherlands   Zambia  ECM  .282  -1.140 
(-.794) 






United Kingdom  Zambia  ECM  -.296  -.919 
(-1.23) 
.342  -1.361  -.617 
(-.992) 
.367 
Avocados  France  Kenya  ECM  .984  -.116 
(-.105) 




Table 4.Specific tariff-equivalent (%) of Technical barriers applied to horticultural exports of Kenya and Zambia to some 
leading EU-15 importing countries Legend: FR: France; DE: Germany; NL: Netherlands; UK: United Kingdom; aberrant results are indicated in 
italic.  
Kenya  Zambia 
Green beans  Peas  Avocados  Peas 
 
Year 































































































































































































Mean  -0.50  56.11  37.38  -2.22  10.87  8.11  6.10  0.28  8.10 
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